CUSTOMS, EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL NEW DELHI

PRINCIPAL BENCH - COURT NO. I

CUSTOMS APPEAL NO. 288 OF 2006

(Arising out of Order-in-Original No. 8/06 dated 31.01.2006 passed by the Commissioner of Customs, ICD, Tughlakabad, New Delhi)

Sh. Ratinder Pal Singh Bhatia

.....Appellant

@ Roampy Bhatia, D-44, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi

VERSUS

Commissioner of Customs, ICD, Tughlakabad New DelhiRespondent

APPEARANCE:

Shri A.K. Prasad and Ms. Surbhi Sinha, Advocates for the Appellant Shri Rajesh Singh, Authorized Representative for the Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DILIP GUPTA, PRESIDENT

HON'BLE MR. P.V. SUBBA RAO, MEMBER (TECHNICAL)

DATE OF HEARING: 30.05.2025 DATE OF DECISION: 06.06.2025

FINAL ORDER NO. <u>50854/2025</u>

JUSTICE DILIP GUPTA:

Ratinder Pal Singh Bhatia¹ has filed this appeal to assail the order dated 31.01.2006 passed by the Commissioner of Customs, ICD, Tughlakabad, New Delhi² imposing a penalty of Rs. 3 lakhs upon him under sections 114 and 112 of the Customs Act, 1962³.

2. Intelligence was received by the department that M/s. Sundram Export Pvt. Ltd.⁴ and M/s. Netcompware Pvt. Ltd.⁵ had exported CD-ROMs

^{1.} the appellant

^{2.} the Commissioner

^{3.} the Customs Act

^{4.} Sundram Export

^{5.} Netcompware

under Duty Entitlement Pass Book⁶ Scheme by grossly overvaluing it with an intention to wrongly avail DEPB scrips and thereby evade customs duty. Enquiries were, therefore, initiated by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence⁷. Statement of various persons, including the appellant, were recorded and ultimately a show cause notice dated 04.12.2000 was issued to 26 persons including the appellant.

3. The case setup by the department in the show cause notice is that Sundram Export exported 96,800 pieces of CD-ROMs at highly inflated Freight on Board⁸ value of US 19\$ per piece. Another exporter, by name of Netcompware, also exported a consignment of 40,000 pieces of CD-ROMs at overvalued price of US 19\$ per piece. The 5 shipping bills covering the above exports were filed under the DEPB Scheme. According to the department, the overvalued export was used by the exporter to fraudulently procure DEPB scrips from the Directorate General of Foreign $\mathsf{Trade}^{\mathbf{9}}$ and subsequently these DEPB scrips were sold in the open market and were thereafter used by companies to import goods without payment of duty. It is also the case of the department that the 40,000 CD-ROMs exported by Netcompware to Hong Kong were subsequently re-imported and cleared by M/s. Arvind International under a Bill of Entry dated 08.09.1998. It is said that the partner of this Arvind International is Pankaj Soni, an employee of Empire Safe Company owned by the appellant and that the appellant had knowledge that the 40,000 CD-ROMs which were imported were the same CD-ROMs which had earlier been exported by Netcompware.

^{6.} DEPB

^{7.} DR

^{8.} FOB

^{9.} DGFT

^{10.} Arvind International

4. The impugned order imposes a penalty of Rs. 3 lakhs upon the appellant under sections 114 and 112 of the Customs Act. The relevant portion of impugned order, in so far as it deals with the appellant, is reproduced below:

"42(G) *****

Shri Ratinder Pal Singh Bhatia in his statements dated 28.6.99 and 24.3.2000 admitted that on being asked by Shri Deept Sarup Aggarwal, he had imported 40,000 CD ROM's in the name of M/s. Arvind International which were cleared from Mumbai under B/E no. 4803 dated 08.09.1998; that the CD ROM's after clearance were handed over to Shri Deept Sarup Aggarwal who paid him Rs. 2,00,000/- for getting the goods cleared; Shri Deept Sarup Aggarwal had told him that these CD ROM's were earlier exported by him through M/s. Netcompware Pvt. Ltd.; that Shri Ashfaq Beig and Shri Anil Sethi used to bring drafts to get them encashed through the account of M/s. Harkishan Overseas. These averments clearly shows the culpable mind of Shri Ratinder Pal Singh Bhatia as he had willfully / intentionally acted in collusion with Shri Deept Sarup Aggarwal for which he had been paid Rs. 2,00,000/-. His involvement is corroborated by that statement 22.11.1999 and 03.04.2000 of Shri Pankaj Soni in which he stated that he was inducted as partner of M/s. Arvind International by Shri Ratinder Pal Singh Bhatia and accounts of M/s. M/s. Harkishan Overseas and Arvind International were being operated by Shri Ratinder Pal Singh Bhatia; that he was working on the instructions of Shri Ratinder Pal Singh Bhatia and he used to get nominal amount per transaction. His involvement is further corroborated by the statement dated 28.06.2000 tendered by Shri Raminder Mohan Singh in which he stated "the export of 40,000 pcs. of CD ROMs under DEPB scheme by M/s Netcompware Pvt. Ltd. was made by Shri Arjun Amla & Shri Sanjay Sachdeva, Shri Deept Sarup Aggarwal and Shri Roampy Bhatia and they all were the beneficiaries of this export; that to give legal shape to the remittances received in the name of M/s Netcompware Pvt. Ltd. the pay orders were issued in favour of M/s Harkishan Overseas from where these were encashed; that the role of Shri Pankaj Soni in encashment of remittances of M/s Netcompware Pvt. Ltd. through the account of M/s Harkishan Overseas was limited and that Shri Pankaj Soni was acting on the instructions of Shri Roampy Bhatia". However, Shri Ratinder Pal Singh **Bhatia** in his statement tendered 21.08.2000, before he was placed under arrest, reversed his earlier statements and deposed that he was not aware of any role of Shi Arjun Amla and Shri Sanjay Sachdeva in the import of CD ROM's exported by M/s Netcompware Pvt. Ltd.; that neither he was involved or had pressurised/ ever told him (Shri Pankaj Soni) to encash the draft given by M/s Netcompware Pvt. Ltd. nor he had played any role in the export of CD ROM's by M/s Netcompware Pvt. Ltd.. It appears that he apprehended about his arrest along with Shri Deept Sarup Aggarwal as earlier Shri Bimal Kumar Jain, Shri Rajesh Aggarwal had been arrested in the case and he attempted to save himself by reversing the averments earlier made by him. None of statement had been retracted by him and it appears he is not interested to defend his case / has nothing to add and agrees with the findings of investigating agency."

- 5. Shri A.K. Prasad, learned counsel of the appellant assisted by Ms. Surbhi Sinha made the following submissions:
 - (i) The goods once exported do not fall within the ambit of "export goods" as defined under section 2(19) of the Customs Act. Thus, the provisions of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Export Goods) Rules,

- 2007¹¹ cannot be invoked for re-determining the valuation of the goods. In support of this contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in **Jairath International** vs. **Union of India**¹²;
- the appellant, Pankaj Soni and Raminder Mohan Singh under section 108 of the Customs Act. Such statements cannot be relied upon in view of the provisions of section 138B of the Customs Act and in support of this contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Tribunal in M/s. Drolia Electrosteel P. Ltd. vs. Commissioner, Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax, Raipur¹³; and
- (iii) The appellant is not at all connected with the import of 40,000 CD-ROMs and the finding to the contrary has been recorded by the Commissioner only on the basis of statements made under section 108 of the Customs Act.
- 6. Shri Rajesh Singh, learned authorized representative appearing for the department, however, supported the impugned order and made the following submissions:
 - (i) The order passed by the Commissioner is a detailed order and has taken into consideration all the relevant facts;
 - (ii) DGFT by order dated 18.07.2000 cancelled the DEPB License dated 30.06.1998 issued to Netcompware;

^{11.} the Customs Valuation Rules

^{12. 2019 (370)} E.L.T. 116 (P & H)

^{13.} Excise Appeal No. 52612 of 2018 decided on 30.10.2023

- (iii) The case involves fraudulent activities by various individual and entities regarding misuse of DEPB scrips and gross over-invoicing;
- (iv) The appellant facilitated the import of 40,000 CD-ROMs through Arvind International; and
- (v) Penalty has been correctly imposed upon the appellant in view of the statements of the appellant and Pankaj Soni.
- 7. The submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned authorized representative appearing for the department have been considered.
- 8. A perusal of the impugned order, so far as it relates to the appellant, shows that it has placed reliance upon the statements made by the appellant on 28.06.1999 and 24.03.2000 under section 108 of the Customs Act that he was involved in the import of 40,000 CD-ROMs by Arvind International. The Commissioner has also placed reliance upon the statements made by Pankaj Soni on 22.11.1999 and 03.04.2000 under section 108 of the Customs Act as also the statement made on 28.06.2000 by Raminder Mohan Singh under section 108 of the Customs Act. The Commissioner has also considered the statement dated 21.08.2000 made by the appellant retracting his earlier statements made under section 108 of the Customs Act.
- 9. The statements made under section 108 of the Customs Act cannot be relied upon if the procedure followed under section 138B of the Customs Act is not followed. This is what was held by the Tribunal in M/s. Surya Wires Pvt. Ltd. vs. Principal Commissioner, CGST, Raipur¹⁴. The Tribunal examined the provisions of sections 108 and 138B of the

^{14.} Excise Appeal No. 51148 of 2020 decided on 01.04.2025

Customs Act as also the provisions of sections 14 and 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and observed:

~21. It would be seen section 14 of the Central Excise Act and section 108 of the Customs Act enable the concerned Officers to summon any person whose attendance they consider necessary to give evidence in any inquiry which such Officers are making. The statements of the persons so summoned are then recorded under these provisions. It is these statements which are referred to either in section 9D of the Central Excise Act or in section 138B of the Customs Act. A bare perusal of sub-section (1) of these two sections makes it evident that the statement recorded before the concerned Officer during the course of any inquiry or proceeding shall be relevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the facts which it contains only when the person who made the statement is examined as a witness before the Court and such Court is of the opinion that having regard to the circumstances of the case, the statement should be admitted in evidence, in the interests of justice, except where the person who tendered the statement is dead or cannot be found. In view of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 9D of the Central Excise Act or sub-section (2) of section 138B of the Customs Act, the provisions of sub-section (1) of these two Acts shall apply to any proceedings under the Central Excise Act or the Customs Act as they apply in relation to proceedings before a Court. What, therefore, follows is that a person who makes a statement during the course of an inquiry has to be first examined as a witness before the adjudicating authority thereafter the adjudicating authority has to form an opinion whether having regard to the circumstances of the case the statement should be admitted in evidence, in the interests of justice. Once this determination regarding admissibility of the statement of a witness is made by the adjudicating authority, the statement will be admitted as an evidence and

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an opportunity of cross-examination of the witness is then required to be given to the person against whom such statement has been made. It is only when this procedure is followed that the statements of the persons making them would be of relevance for the purpose of proving the facts which they contain."

- 10. After examining various judgments of the High Courts and the Tribunal, the Tribunal observed:
 - **"28.** It, therefore, transpires from the aforesaid decisions that both section 9D(1)(b) of the Central Excise Act and section 138B(1)(b) of the Customs Act contemplate that when the provisions of clause (a) of these two sections are not applicable, then the statements made under section 14 of the Central Excise Act or under section 108 of the Customs Act during the course of an inquiry under the Acts shall be relevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the facts contained in them only when such persons are examined as witnesses before the adjudicating authority and the adjudicating authority forms an opinion that the statements should be admitted in evidence. It is thereafter that an opportunity has to be provided for cross-examination of such persons. The provisions of section 9D of the Central Excise Act and section 138B(1)(b) of the Customs Act have been held to be mandatory and failure to comply with the procedure would mean that no reliance can be placed on the statements recorded either under section 14D of the Central Excise Act or under section 108 of the Customs Act. The Courts have also explained the rationale behind the precautions contained in the two sections. It has been observed that the statements recorded during inquiry/investigation by officers has every chance of being recorded under coercion or compulsion and it is in order to neutralize this possibility that statements of the witnesses

have to be recorded before the adjudicating authority, after which such statements can be admitted in evidence."

- 11. In **Drolia Electrosteel**, the Tribunal had also while examining the provisions of section 9D of the Central Excise Act held:
 - "13. Of the above, the 35 statements of various persons recorded under the Central Excise Act will be relevant to the proceedings only as per section 9D which lays down the procedure to be followed to make them relevant and the exceptions to such procedure.

 - 14. Evidently, the statements will relevant under certain circumstances and these are given in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1). There is no assertion by either side that the circumstances indicated in (a) existed in the case. It leaves us with (b) which requires the court or the adjudicating authority to first examine the person who made the statement and form an opinion that having regard to the circumstances of the case, the statement should be admitted in evidence. Of course, the party adversely affected by the statement will have to be given an opportunity to cross examine the person who made the statement but that comes only after the statement is, in the first place, after examination by the adjudicating authority, admitted in evidence. This has not been done in respect of any of the 35 statements. Therefore, all the statements are not relevant to the proceedings.
 - 15. It has been held in a catena of judgments including Jindal Drugs Pvt. Ltd. versus Union of India [2016 (340) E.L.T. 67 (P&H)] that section 9D is a mandatory provision and if the procedure prescribed therein is not followed, statements cannot be used as evidence in the proceedings under

Central Excise Act. The relevant extracts are as follows:

- "13. Once the ambit of Section 9D(1) is thus recognized and understood, one has to turn to the circumstances referred to in the said subsection, which are contained in clauses (a) and (b) thereof.
- 14. Clause (a) of Section 9D(1) refers to the following circumstances :
- (i) when the person who made the statement is dead,
- (ii) when the person who made the statement cannot be found,
- (iii) when the person who made the statement is incapable of giving evidence,
- (iv) when the person who made the statement is kept out of the way by the adverse party, and (v) when the presence of the person who made the statement cannot be obtained without unreasonable delay or expense.
- 15. Once discretion, to be judicially exercised is, thus conferred, by Section 9D, on the adjudicating authority, it is selfevident inference that the decision flowing from the exercise of such discretion, i.e., the order which would be passed, by the adjudicating authority under Section 9D, if he chooses to invoke clause (a) of subsection (1) thereof, would be pregnable to challenge. While the judgment of the Delhi High Court in J&K Cigarettes Ltd. (supra) holds that the said challenge could be ventilated in appeal, the petitioners have also invited attention to an unreported short order of the Supreme Court in UOI and Another v. GTC India and Others in SLP (C) No. 2183/1994, dated 3-1-1995 wherein it was held that the order passed by the adjudicating authority under Section 9D of the Act could be challenged in writ proceedings as well. Therefore, it is clear that the adjudicating authority cannot invoke Section 9D(1)(a) of the Act without passing a reasoned and speaking order in that regard, which is amenable to challenge by the assessee, if aggrieved thereby.
- 16. If none of the circumstances contemplated by clause (a) of Section 9D(1) exists, clause (b) of Section 9D(1) comes into operation. The said clause prescribes a specific procedure to be followed before the statement can be admitted in evidence. Under this procedure,

two steps are required to be followed by the adjudicating authority, under clause (b) of Section 9D(1), viz.

- (i) the person who made the statement has to first be examined as a witness in the case before the adjudicating authority, and
- (ii) the person who made the statement has to first be examined as a witness in the case before the adjudicating authority, and
- 17. There is no justification for jettisoning this procedure, statutorily prescribed by plenary Parliamentary legislation for admitting, into evidence, a statement recorded before the Gazetted Central Excise Officer, which does not suffer from the handicaps contemplated by clause (a) of Section 9D(1) of the Act. The use of the word "shall" in Section 9D(1), makes it clear that, the provisions contemplated in the sub-section are mandatory. Indeed, as they pertain to conferment of admissibility to oral evidence they would, even otherwise, have to be recorded as mandatory.
- 18. The rationale behind the above precaution contained in clause (b) of Section 9D(1) is obvious. The statement, recorded during inquiry/investigation, by the Gazetted Central Excise Officer, has every chance of having been recorded under coercion or compulsion. It is a matter of common knowledge that, on many occasions, the DRI/DGCEI resorts compulsion in order to extract confessional statements. It is obviously in order to neutralize this possibility that, before admitting such a statement in evidence, clause (b) of Section 9D(1) mandates that the evidence of the witness has to be recorded before the adjudicating authority, as, in such atmosphere, there would be no occasion for any trepidation on the part of the witness concerned.
- 19. Clearly, therefore, the stage of relevance, in adjudication proceedings, of the statement, recorded before a Gazetted Central Excise Officer during inquiry or investigation, would arise only after the statement is admitted in evidence in accordance with the procedure prescribed in clause (b) of Section 9D(1). The rigour of this procedure is exempted only in a case in which one or more of the handicaps referred to in clause (a) of Section 9D(1) of the Act would apply. In

view of this express stipulation in the Act, it is not open to any adjudicating authority to straightaway rely on the statement recorded during investigation/inquiry before the Gazetted Central Excise Officer, unless and until he can legitimately invoke clause (a) of Section 9D(1). In all other cases, if he wants to rely on the said statement as relevant, for proving the truth of the contents thereof, he has to first admit the statement in evidence in accordance with clause (b) of Section 9D(1). For this, he has to summon the person who had made the statement, examine him as witness before him in the adjudication proceeding, and arrive at an that, having regard circumstances of the case, the statement should be admitted in the interests of justice.

20. In fact, Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, clearly sets out the sequence of evidence, in which evidence-in-chief has to precede cross-examination, and cross-examination has to precede re-examination".

16. Therefore, the 35 statements relied upon in the SCN are not relevant and hence also not admissible."

- 12. Except for the aforesaid statements made under section 108 of the Customs Act, there is no other evidence which has been considered by the Commissioner in the impugned order for imposing penalty upon the appellant under sections 114 and 112 of the Customs Act. As these statements cannot be relied upon, the imposition of penalty upon the appellant under sections 114 and 112 of the Customs Act cannot be sustained and is set aside.
- 13. It also needs to be noted that the goods have been confiscated under section 113(d) of the Customs Act. Section 113(d) is reproduced below:

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"113. Confiscation of goods attempted to be improperly exported, etc.

The following export goods shall be liable to confiscation:

- (a) *****
- (b) ****
- (c) ****
- (d) any goods attempted to be exported or brought within the limits of any customs area for the purpose of being exported, contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force"
- 14. In the present case, the goods had been exported and, therefore, the goods could not have been confiscated under section 113(d) of the Customs Act. Penalty under section 114 of the Customs Act can be levied only if the goods are held liable to confiscation under section 113 of the Customs Act. As the confiscation cannot be sustained, penalty under section 114 of the Customs Act cannot also be sustained.
- 15. The impugned order dated 31.01.2006 passed by the Commissioner in so far as it imposes penalty upon the appellant under sections 114 and 112 of the Customs Act is set aside and the appeal is allowed.

(Order pronounced on $\underline{06.06.2025}$)

(JUSTICE DILIP GUPTA)
PRESIDENT

(P.V. SUBBA RAO)
MEMBER (TECHNICAL)

Shreya